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Will TARGET2-Balances be Reduced again after an End of the Crisis?
Abstract:
This article deals with the macro-economics of the Trans-European Automated Re-
al-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). Originally, the 
TARGET2 was in-tended to solely function as a monetary arrangement for liquidity 
issues. It is shown that the TARGET2 contributes to a substantial misallocation of 
real resources within the Eurozone (EZ). The discussion highlights that there are no 
tendencies for rebalancing TARGET2-claims and liabilities, but rather a dynamic 
towards infinite and prolonged TARGET2-imbalances in the form of hysteresis.
1. Introduction
The formation of the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Ex-
press Transfer System (TARGET2) is subject to a fierce academic debate. This dis-
pute gains momentum as TARGET2-imbalances between the National Central 
Banks (NCBs) within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are gradually 
approaching the 1 trillion Euro edge.1 First, the debate deals with liquidity, cross-
border payment and similar monetary issues (e.g., Abad et al. 2011, Bindseil and 
König 2011, Buiter et al. 2011). Second, the discussion centres on the NCBs’ bal-
ance-sheet risks and costs arising from of a potential break-up of the Euro (cf. 
Wheelan 2012). This rather macro-economic discussion also touches inadequate 
provision of and stipulations on financing of current account transactions within the 
Eurozone (EZ) (Sinn 2011, Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011). Other contributions 
address issues of TARGET2-imbalances in context of a misallocation within con-
text of the real economic integration of EZ members (Fahrholz and Freytag 2011). 
In a similar manner, this contribution tackles issues related to the TARGET2 from 
the vantage point of the balance-of-payments. This perspective, which stretches out 
1 Please refer, e.g., to the Euro Crisis Monitor, which provides continuously updated figures for 
TARGET2-imbalances (Westermann and Steinkamp 2012).
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beyond payment and liquidity affairs, helps comprehend the macro-economic im-
plications of TARGET2. In this regard, the particular focus is on the question of 
whether already accumulated TARGET2-imbalances are likely to be automatically 
brought down to zero again after resolving the balance-of-payments crisis within 
the EZ.
In this contribution, we set forth theoretical arguments which demonstrate that ‘ir-
regular’ TARGET2-balances will not disappear but will partly linger on. The hyste-
resis effect pertains to the TARGET2-balances which are used for financing current 
account transactions during ‘crisis times’. A key insight is that these TARGET2-
imbalances will eventually demand a political solution for the netting of TAR-
GET2-claims and liabilities subject to a hysteresis effect. The according claims will 
possibly turn out to be irrecoverable as soon as the private financial sector takes up 
the lead again in financing net capital flows within the EZ.
This paper consists of six sections. Following the introduction, we briefly overview 
the macro-economic basics of TARGET2 in section 2. In section 3 we explain the 
temporary occurrence of regular TARGET2-balances. We present this issue in con-
text of the run-up to the European balance-of-payments crisis. In doing so, we dis-
tinguish core and periphery economies. Then, in section 4, we discuss key charac-
teristics of irregular TARGET2-balances and highlight the way in which such a 
monetary arrangement aggravates the real misallocation within the EZ. The on-
going magnification and the danger of hysteresis of these imbalances are subject to 
section 5. Finally, concluding remarks concerning the TARGET2 policy debate 
round off the contribution.
2. Some Macro-economic Basics of TARGET2
The TARGET2 is an electronic payment and settlement system used for cross-
border financial transactions among participating Monetary Financial Institutions 
(MFI) and NCBs within the ESCB. The host of this Real Time Gross Settlement 
System (RTGS) is the Eurosystem, which consists of the European Central Bank 
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(ECB) and those NCBs which have introduced the Euro as legal tender. In general, 
member of the Eurosystem may infinitely accumulate credits and debits within the 
TARGET2 (Garber 1999:206f.). The size of TARGET2-imbalances is solely limited 
by eligible collateral requirements and the actual Eurosystem’s balance sheet. This 
is different to conventional cross-border RTGS, at which negative balances (i.e., 
debits) may be temporally financed by the public or private operator of the RTGS. 
This can be done using several different instruments, for instance, intraday repur-
chasing operations (e.g., Switzerland and Liechtenstein) or collateralized intraday 
credits (e.g., France and Monaco). Another possibility is, for example, to accumu-
late transactions on a clearing account and process them in small tranches. This 
means to put cross-border payments in a waiting loop and deleting them in the case 
of insufficient coverage (e.g., within the former Italian Lira-zone with San Marino 
and the Vatican). Apart from members of the Eurosystem, the TARGET2 is also 
accessible for NCBs belonging to the ESCB, though, without using the Euro as a 
currency. In contrast to the so-called ‘In-NCBs’, these particular ‘Out-NCBs’ can 
only use the TARGET2 if they run positive TARGET2-balances. On this basis cur-
rently Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania are participating 
in the TARGET2. Other economies running an own RTGS may also connect to the 
TARGET2 via an ‘interlink mechanism’. Such agreements have also been used to 
connect national RTGS of the current ESCB members within the forerunner TAR-
GET. Since the end of 2007 this network of national RTGS was gradually replaced 
by a ‘single shared platform’. The Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank run the technical infrastructure on behalf of the Eurosystem. 
Cross-border financial transactions via the TARGET2 and conducted by MFIs are 
usually executed directly or via corresponding NCBs. Payments via the TARGET2-
account for more than 90% of all cross-border large value payments in systems set-
tling Euro-denominated transactions.2 Cross-border financial transactions between 
ESCB members and countries which neither have introduced the Euro, nor are con-
nected to the TARGET2 (Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the UK) may 
2 See ECB (2011) for further detailed information.
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also affect TARGET2-balances, if the involved MFIs draw on their TARGET2-
accounts at NCBs within the Eurosystem (ECB 2011:105). Apart from this, cross-
border payments affect the foreign exchange account and are, thus, of no further 
interest in the remainder of our analysis.
On the level of ESCB members, 23 NCBs and the ECB are currently participating 
in the TARGET2. All bilateral balances are cleared and netted out per day, so that 
each NCB records a single net bilateral position vis-à-vis the Eurosystem. This is to 
say that the TARGET2 does not record member-specific credit and debit positions 
between individual ESCB members, but between an individual member and the 
entire Eurosystem. This implies that the ECB may also run its ‘individual’ TAR-
GET2-balance. This ECB balance sheet item does comprise of TARGET2-liabilities 
reflecting the corresponding claims of the NCBs of ESCB members that are not 
using the Euro but are participating in the TARGET2 (ECB 2011:219). Further-
more, TARGET2-balances of the ECB are affected, for example, by temporary 
swap agreements with ‘foreign’ NCBs such as the US Federal Reserve (Bundesbank 
2012:144, further, ECB 2012:90) and by contributions to the ECB’s capital (Bun-
desbank 2012:145).3 Notwithstanding these particular characteristics of the ECB’s 
TARGET2-balance, TARGET2-positions adhere to every ESCB members’ net ex-
ternal position. Changes to TARGET2-positions affect members’ credits (e.g., a 
positive TARGET2-balance) or debits (e.g., a negative TARGET2-balance) vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. Legally, a non-balanced TARGET2-position does not rep-
resent a loan agreement. Nevertheless, TARGET2-imbalances involve current and 
capital account transactions that do bear on the real economy and affect overall 
macro-economic risks. A peculiarity about TARGET2 credit and debit settlements is 
that the accounting happens automatically and without any direct approval by the 
counter-party NCB. This is to say that the Eurosystem simply carries out the cross-
border payment orders of the conducting NCB respectively of the connected MFI.
3 Besides, TARGET2-balances are remunerated at the marginal rate for the Eurosystem’s main refi-
nancing operations and are subject to the interim profit distribution, which may bear on other intra-
Eurosystem balances. See ECB (2012:16f.), EU (2011), and Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011:6) for 
further details.
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3. The Formation of Regular TARGET2-balances
A frictionless European cross-border payment and settlement system is important 
for the stability of the financial system, which is a prerequisite for reaping the effi-
ciency gains of real economic integration within the EZ. We argue that a monetary 
arrangement such as the TARGET2 may exert considerable influence on the for-
mation of the real economy. The subsequent analysis will be focusing on balance-
of-payments issues.4 The current and capital account transactions ensuing tempo-
rary TARGET2-balances within the EZ may also be illustrated by distinguishing 
between core and periphery economies. In this respect, core economies – here: 
Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – are characterized by current 
account surpluses (i.e., net capital exporters or net creditors). The group of core 
economies can be extended by those countries which are participating in the TAR-
GET2 on the basis of compulsory positive TARGET2-balances (see above). The 
faction of periphery economies is generally characterized by current account defi-
cits (i.e., net capital importers or net debtors).
Consider the case of a periphery economy importing of real resources from the core 
via the current account. Here, the periphery issuing a cross-border payment via the 
TARGET2 accrues a negative TARGET2-balance. On the same token, the Eurosys-
tem will enter a TARGET2-claim into the account of the counter-party NCB within 
the core. As long as this process is eventually financed by the private financial sec-
tor within the core, a core economy’s TARGET2-liability stemming from a payment 
for the purchase of periphery financial assets (i.e., the net capital export) re-balance 
its previously recorded TARGET2-claim. At the same time, the periphery economy 
– having previously been incurred with a TARGET2-liability for initiating the 
cross-border payment for the real resource imports from the core – now acts as the 
payee and records a re-balancing TARGET2-claim in return for the core’s net capi-
tal export. The evolving TARGET2-balances are, hence, only of temporary nature. 
4 For this reason, an explicit distinction between MFIs and NCBs will, henceforth, not be made un-
less necessary.
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The details of regular TARGET2-balances pertaining to current account transactions 
are depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1: Regular TARGET2-balances Stemming from Current Account Transac-
tions
Source: own design
The illustration highlights the legal transactions and balance-of-payments relations 
between the core and the periphery of the EZ. It shows a situation in which a private 
agent from a periphery economy purchases real resources produced in the core. The 
private agent from the periphery (private periphery) finances this transaction, for 
example, by a loan from a commercial bank in the periphery (bank periphery), 
which creates a liability of the private agent towards the commercial bank. In turn, 
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the commercial bank holds a claim on the private agent within the periphery. A cur-
rent account deficit occurs in the periphery and an equivalent surplus in the core. As 
long as the current account transfer is refinanced by the private financial sector, i.e., 
a commercial bank in a core economy (bank core), the core actually finances the 
real transfer in a regular way in the form of net capital exports. The simplified sce-
nario in figure 1 assumes that the payment for the delivery of the resources is made 
to the account of the commercial bank (bank core) associated with the private agent 
(private core) in the core economy. In this case the commercial bank has liability 
towards the private agent in the core economy, while the private agent has a claim 
towards the bank. Thus, a private creditor in the core economy faces a private debt-
or in the periphery. This debtor has committed to deliver equivalent resources – i.e., 
in terms of value – in exchange for the advanced delivery of real resources from the 
core at some future point in time.
The TARGET2 has lent support to the inter-temporal exchange or real resources 
between different economies within the EZ. In doing so, it has accommodated the 
catch-up process of periphery economies. Such a real convergence process in terms 
of narrowing income levels, interest and price level differentials between the pe-
riphery and the core has characterized the first decade of the Euro.
4. The Rise of Irregular TARGET2-balances
However, the current European balance-of-payments crisis reveals the untenable 
nature of the catch-up process of the periphery of EZ. There are about three genuine 
economic grounds and one political-economic reason for the emergence of unsus-
tainable real misalignments and subsequent TARGET2-imbalances between the 
core and periphery of EZ. First, relatively higher productivity growth in periphery 
economies has come along with increasing wages. The rising level of wages, how-
ever, could not be exclusively restricted to the sector of tradable resources but has 
spilled over into the sector of non-tradable resources, i.e., the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect occurred. Ultimately, this phenomenon has triggered a real appreciation trend 
and has contributed to real economic imbalances within the EZ. Second, the afore-
Page 9 
Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No 30  
mentioned inclination towards real appreciation and excessive indebtedness within 
periphery economies has been topped by a private sector convergence play. This is 
to say that capital markets participants have believed in a successful economic con-
vergence process at the outset of EZ membership. For this reason, there has been a
fall in risk premia from the perspective of the private financial sector at the com-
mencement of the Euro. In this regard, the financing costs of the periphery have 
fallen relatively more compared to the EZ core. The convergence play has further 
contributed to excessive provision of private sector financing for indebtedness. As-
suming, third, that due to existing financial constraints in periphery economies cred-
it demand was substantially constrained, admittance to the EZ has largely alleviated 
these constraints. Both the private and the public sector have seized the opportunity 
to increase borrowing. This has also built grounds for enhanced risk taking in these 
economies (cf. Korinek 2011, Lorenzoni 2008). Equipped with these new credit 
funds, enhanced demand side pressures led to increased domestic supply of goods 
and services in combination with a rapid increase in imports. Although this situation 
of excess demand would imply an upward trend in the price level, in the case of 
small open economies in a currency union, the leeway for diverging price levels has 
been low but translated into mounting real economic imbalances.
For all these genuine economic reasons, real misalignments have emerged between 
the EZ core and periphery. At the same time, it has turned out that there are hardly 
any incentives for cushioning against potential adversities of untenable catch-up
processes within the periphery. Indebtedness usually gives policymakers front-
loaded benefits in terms of stimulating production and employment in the short run 
and only delayed costs in terms of putting the long-term financial stability of the 
entire EZ at risk. The political moral-hazard behaviour has been aggravated by the 
‘irrevocability’ of EZ membership, which represents an implicit guarantee that EZ 
economies will eventually bail out each other (Fahrholz and Wójcik 2012). It was 
exactly this implicit guarantee why the private financial sector has been rather 
oblivious during the fast catch-up process to increasing indebtedness, which has 
rendered the economic situation within the EZ unbearable. In general, a situation of 
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real misalignments becomes visible once financing conditions for on-going
indebtedness worsen. As immoderate real appreciation and over-indebtedness 
ensued the real catch-up slowed down and has turned into a full-fledged European 
balance-of-payments crisis. The root causes of the unsustainable catch-up process 
of EZ periphery do certainly not pertain to the TARGET2. However, a 
dysfunctional TARGET2 still exacerbates real misalignments and, most notably, 
supports the magnification of irregular and possibly irrecoverable TARGET2-
balances within the EZ.
The emergence of TARGET2-imbalances, reflecting real misalignments, do not 
stem from the monetary arrangement itself, but from economic agents’ basic trans-
actions. These movements pertain to current and capital account transactions trans-
lating into cross-border financial transactions. Whether cross-border financial trans-
actions take place or not is normally a matter of liquidity and eligible collateral 
within the private financial sector. When lacking a sufficient amount of individual 
deposits the private financial sector may borrow liquidity from the corresponding 
NCB and/or the ECB. It is worth-noting that the TARGET2 is no procurement of 
liquidity, but that this monetary arrangement indicates shifts in EZ members’ de-
mand for central bank liquidity when falling short of interbank market access. The 
retrieval of central bank liquidity is subject to the general Eurosystem eligibility for 
credit claims. During the current balance-of-payments crisis, there is a concomitant 
drop in collateral requirements within the Eurosystem. Recently, the ECB has also 
granted decision making power concerning eligible collateral requirements to se-
lected NCBs. This fragmentation process of the ECB monetary policy has been la-
belled “balkanization” (Buiter 2012). Apart from imposed, though relaxed, re-
strictions on collateral holdings, the total amount of central bank liquidity, i.e., the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet, shapes and limits the formation of TARGET2-
balances. Voluminous supply of liquidity within the EZ has supported ailing MFIs, 
which lack re-financing opportunities within the private financial sector (Ulbrich 
and Lipponer 2012:75). Both the ECB and NCB may fill the void that the dried-up
interbank market has left within the private financial sector. The ECB, for instance, 
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has injected liquidity via its Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO). Individual 
NCBs may also provide liquidity by drawing on the Emergency Liquidity Assis-
tance (ELA).5 When NCBs unilaterally deviate from the general Eurosystem eligi-
ble collateral requirements, especially ELA enables MFIs to initiate cross-border 
financial transactions even if no collateralized lending at the ECB were possible. 
Although gains and losses from ELA and related collateral operations are seemingly 
not pooled but nation-specific, the TARGET2 allows for transferring according 
credit claims and related macro-economic risks to the entire EZ. Not the risks for 
the European monetary policies stemming from softened collateral requirements 
and excessive liquidity provisions, but the macro-economic implications of a dys-
functional monetary arrangement for cross-border payment and settlement will be 
the centre-piece of the following elaborations on the rise of irregular TARGET2-
balances.
It is a commonplace that the balances of the current account and the capital account, 
which includes TARGET2-balances, eventually offset each other. An economy, 
from which a cross-border financial transaction is initiated, will have a TARGET2-
liability, while the recipient will have a TARGET2-claim. Also in context of the 
European balance-of-payments crisis, pointing to an unsustainable catch-up process 
of periphery members within the EZ, there are two different kinds of basic transac-
tions that stir irregular TARGET2-balances. First, basic transactions refer to current 
account movements, which are at the heart of our analysis. Second, portfolio dispo-
sitions immediately bear on the capital account. Regarding the conjectured hystere-
sis effect, only basic transactions pertaining to the current account will possibly 
result in irrecoverable TARGET2-claims. Basic transactions predominantly tracing 
in capital movements and portfolio reshufflings do very much contribute to the 
troublesome extent of TARGERT2 balances. Most notably, however, this portion of 
irregular TARGET2-balances will be reduced naturally when the current European 
5 Every NCB of the Eurosystem is legally allowed to provide ELA facilities unless the ECB Govern-
ing Council vetoes such an operation by a majority of two thirds. To our knowledge, information on 
frequency, size, collateral holdings and other terms of the ELA facilities is not publically available.
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balance-of-payments crisis subsides and when the private financial sector resumes 
the accommodation of real catch-up processes within the EZ periphery. We subse-
quently expound the key feature of irregular TARGET2-balances stemming from 
current account transactions by distinguishing the very same from the TARGET2-
balances resulting primarily from capital movements respectively portfolio disposi-
tions.
A discussion of capital account transactions may help comprehend the peculiarities 
of TARGET2-balances tracing in current account transactions. Capital account 
transactions in the form of both financial consolidation and particularly capital 
flight may trigger irregular TARGET2-balances. In the case of financial consolida-
tion, for example, agents in a core economy may liquidate and repatriate foreign 
assets within the periphery. As cross-border payments are initiated within the pe-
riphery, this economy consequently exhibit additional TARGET2-liabilities, while 
the core economy piles up TARGET2-claims. Basically, the same kind of irregular 
TARGET2-balances evolve in the course of capital flight from the periphery to the 
core. In the case of capital flight private agents in either the periphery or the core 
transfer financial assets held in the periphery to the core economies, which seem-
ingly represents a ‘safe haven’. As the periphery commercial banks in both cases 
are no longer able to refinance themselves with loans from the private financial sec-
tor, they will seek refinancing via their NCB instead. The resulting payments lead to 
TARGET2-liabilities for the periphery NCB, while the operator of TARGET2 will 
enter the corresponding TARGET2-claims to the accounts of the effected NCBs in 
the core. Therefore, the capital flight from the periphery leads to an exceptional 
increase of the TARGET2-claims of a core economy in comparison to what the 
economies’ current accounts may suggest. All irregular TARGET2-balances per-
taining to immediate capital account transactions exacerbate the European balance-
of-payments crisis.
When the private financial sector stops financing current account deficits of the EZ 
periphery, then the TARGET2 steps in, thus, forming a quasi-public financial sector. 
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In the case of dried-up interbank markets (see figure 2), the periphery bank (bank 
periphery), which needs to refinance its loan to a private agent (private periphery), 
will take a loan from its NCB (NCB periphery).
Figure 2: Irregular TARGET2-balances Stemming from Current Account Transac-
tions
Source: own design
For this purpose the commercial bank will have to provide collateral to its NCB.6
The periphery NCB has a claim against the commercial bank. At the same time, a 
TARGET2-liability is created for the NCB in the periphery due to the initiated 
6 Besides, the collateralization of the central bank loan remains with the periphery NCB. This im-
plies that the TARGET2-claim of the NCB in the core economy vis-à-vis the Eurosystem is not di-
rectly collateralized by the debtor within the EZ periphery.
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cross-border financial payment in exchange for the import of real resources via the 
current account. The Eurosystem automatically books the corresponding TAR-
GET2-claim into the account of the NCB in the core economy (NCB core). At the 
same time, this NCB receives a deposit from a commercial bank (bank core), which 
in this simplified example of figure 2 has transferred the payment of the payee (pri-
vate core) to its NCB. The financing of this transfer of real resources from the core 
to the periphery is very much akin to a central bank loan. Similar short-term credits 
always arise within context of cross-border financial transactions (see above). Op-
posed to the normal case with temporary balances, however, we are here dealing 
with a situation in which the according creditor is a public agent (NCB core) instead 
of being private as is the case with the commercial bank (bank core) in figure 1. The 
circular flows that eventually clear temporary TARGET2-balances as depicted in 
the previous figure 1 do not occur in figure 2. This is to say that the off-setting pri-
vate capital account transactions bringing down regular (temporary) TARGET2-
balances stemming from previous current account transactions do not arise in crisis 
times. Interestingly, irregular TARGET2-balances imply that private agents as net 
debtors within the EZ periphery now encounter public entities – i.e., NCBs in the 
core – as their corresponding creditors. This is a key characteristic of TARGET2-
claims and liabilities, primarily resulting from an ancillary but inadequate provision 
of financing for current account transactions in crisis times, which are subject to the 
conjectured hysteresis effect.
5. The Hysteresis of Irregular TARGET2-balances
The EZ currently experiences a balance-of-payments crisis as the private financial 
sector doubts the ability of the periphery to fulfil its future obligations. For this rea-
son the private financial sector does not supply any further credit but resorts to fi-
nancial consolidation and capital flight from the periphery. The rising TARGET2-
imbalances reflect changing positions of net creditors and debtors within the EZ. A 
bulk of remedies exist in other rather private RTGS (see above) for mitigating mar-
ket distortions stemming from excessive imbalances in cross-border financial 
RTGS. However, the TARGET2 does not comprise of any restriction except for 
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eligible collateral requirements. There are seemingly no upward boundaries on 
TARGET2-imbalances. The reason for the exceptional rise in TARGET2-balances 
lies within the present balance-of-payments crisis, which acts upon the mechanisms 
of TARGET2 like an exogenous shock. In this context the question arises, whether 
the rise of irregular TARGET2-balances will ever come to a turning point, possibly 
even disappear, or whether a hysteresis effect will prevail and freeze these balances.
Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical situation, in which the Euro has made it through the 
current balance-of-payments crisis fully intact. In such a situation, most of the flow 
of financial assets and according TARGET2-imbalances in the course of particular 
capital account movements – i.e., financial consolidation and capital flight – during 
crisis times will be reversed. The reason is simply that all relevant contractual obli-
gations refer to legal transactions between private entities. However, this is different 
from the case of irregular TARGET2-balances stemming from current account 
transactions, at which public NCBs in the core hold TARGET2-claims against pri-
vate agents within the periphery. This monetary arrangement, however, does not 
foresee that the due positions, in form of negative and positive TARGET2-balances, 
have to be settled in the future. This might eventually be done by supplying securi-
ties in the form of gold or foreign-exchange reserves or last but not least with pro-
duced resources. Figure 3 illustrates that irregular TARGET2-balances pertaining to 
current account transactions during crisis times will not decrease, even if the pe-
riphery managed to outgrow its accumulated debts.
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Figure 3: A Hysteresis Effect in the Case of Irregular TARGET2-balances
Source: own design
The reason for this hysteresis effect is that new regular (temporary!) TARGET2-
claims and liabilities would evolve within the revamped EZ. Resurrected private 
financial sector activities will again make allowance for private net capital exports 
from the core to the periphery refinancing the periphery’s purchase of real resource 
imports from the core. The accruing TARGET2-liabilities for the cross-border pay-
ment towards the core economy is offset by TARGET2-claims stemming from the 
core’s privately financed net capital export towards the periphery and vice versa. 
Analogous, but reverse flows occur when the agents in the periphery repay their 
debt with the core.
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However, the irregular TARGET2-balances stemming from current account transac-
tions during crisis times remain untouched. TARGET2-liabilities do not represent 
ordinary debt as these positions have been built up without the approval of the net 
creditor, i.e., the EZ core. The EZ periphery may feel only bound by legally ar-
ranged loan agreements and similar contracts and will only repay the ordinary debt 
based on such contracts. They may feel less inclined towards repaying debt origi-
nating from a clearing item at an NCB’s balance sheet. Therefore, some portion of 
irregular TARGET2-claims or liabilities accumulated during crisis times will re-
main at exceptional levels due to the hysteresis effect. This hysteresis effect dis-
plays contract abiding behaviour. The questions arise whether there is a need for 
reconciling TARGET2-imbalances, incentives for melting down ‘frozen’ TAR-
GET2-claims and liabilities, and if appropriate instruments are available for doing 
so.
6. Conclusions
In this contribution, we have argued that some irregular TARGET2-balances will 
prevail even after tensions of the current European balance-of-payments crisis 
abate. While the policy debate on TARGET2 mainly identifies only limited risks 
related to a potential break-up of the EZ, we highlight balance sheet risks and mac-
ro-economic costs arising even in case of the Eurosystem weathering this crisis. Our 
discussion shows that the TARGET2 undermines necessary structural economic 
adjustments in the short run and, thus, worsens the balance-of-payments crisis in the 
long run. In this manner, quasi-public sector financing via the TARGET2 steps into 
the gap that occurred in the course of the private financial sector stalemate, when 
the real catch-up of the EZ periphery turned out to be unsustainable. In doing so, the 
TARGET2 does not only contribute to a transfer of originally private risks to the 
public sector, but undermines the necessary structural economic adjustments. This 
means that the TARGET2 is a disguised market-distorting subsidy of whole econo-
mies in the periphery of the Eurosystem. On the same token, the real exports fi-
nanced via the TARGET2 act as automatic stabilizers upon the production of the 
core economies; most notably, excessive liquidity operations in conjunction with 
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the TARGET2 stoke private sector balance sheets and, thus, exert upward pressure 
on the EZ core. At the same time, however, there is no sufficient downward pres-
sure on the real economy of the EZ periphery emanating from this monetary ar-
rangement. In this regard, the TARGET2 impedes the necessary deleveraging in a 
balance-of-payment crisis and the according imbalances reflect a prolonged misal-
location within the real economy of the entire EZ.
The specific problem with the TARGET2 is the hysteresis effect, which means that 
there are no tendencies for a reversal of all TARGET2-imbalances which have been 
piled up and are still swelling in the current balance-of-payment crisis. The hystere-
sis effect particularly pertains to irregular TARGET2-claims and liabilities, which 
have been built up in the course of inadequate current account transactions. The first 
question arises, how to melt down – if at all – TARGET2-imbalances. The second 
question is whether it may be in the interest of a periphery NCB to reduce TAR-
GET2-liabilities in general. While at first glance it may sound implausible, the situ-
ation of Ireland in March 2012 is a good example in place: The Irish government 
repaid about 3 of 35 bn. Euro that the Irish NCB had lent to two Irish commercial 
banks, which later went bankrupt. This endeavor has not only resulted in a contrac-
tion of the Irish NCB’s balance sheet but may help restore the creditworthiness of 
the Irish government as a future debtor. Basically, the very same applies to an entire 
economy, which needs to restore its credibility respectively creditworthiness. 
Hence, we argue that there exist even some incentives, though a matter of political 
discount rates, for repaying debt accumulated in the form of TARGET2-liabilities 
that are subject to a hysteresis effect. Such measure would help reducing the macro-
economic costs of future production from the viewpoint of the EZ periphery. In 
order to make credibility an important aspect of governmental or central banks’ be-
havior, the market forces must not be too much deferred by monetary liquidity op-
erations and fiscal rescue funding programs further increasing the TARGET2-
imbalances. In other words, the cure that increases credibility reduces imbalances.
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